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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
PETER M. LOWE,
Special Administrator of Estate
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Plwintiff arnd Appellarnt
-vs.MAX ROSENLOF, and
\
MAX ROSENLOF
CONSTRUCTION CO.,
J
a partnership
Defenda%t arnd Respondent ,

Case
No. 9348

BRIEF OF AP·P·ELLANT

STATEMENT OF CASE
In this case the plaintiff, T. 0. Nelson, is deceased but
to assist in the clarity of this presentation the word
"plaintiff" shall mean " T. 0. Nelson. "
On or about March 3, 1958, the plaintiff and defendant executed a written subcontract agreement (copy at1
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tached to the complaint) by which the plaintiff, as a subcontractor, undertook to do essentially all of the forming and placing of all concrete for the Lehi High School
Building for which the defendant as ''General Contractor" had been awarded the general contract by the
Alpine School District as "Owner." The plaintiff entered into the performance of this contract immediately
and to get money for the ''move on'' costs the plaintiff
borrowed $1,000.00 from Geneva Rock Products Company, and the defendant cosigned the note with the
plaintiff.
The work progressed until September 10, 1958, when
the defendant was excluded from the job site by the defendant and plaintiff's foreman was fired and the rest of
his employees were put on defendant's payroll. The defendant alleged that plaintiff had "abandoned" the job.
The lower court found that plaintiff had abandoned
the job.
On or about September 16, 1958, the defendant
through his attorney notified plaintiff that he was taking
over the cement work pursuant to paragraph three of
the subcontract. On or about September 25, 1958, the
plaintiff through his attorney demanded the retur:tJ. of all
his tools, concrete forms, and materials from the defendant and controverted defendant's claim of abandonment.
The plaintiff filed an action in the District Court of
Utah County against the defendant and upon the issues
made the matter was tried and the court found that the
defendant had converted the plaintiff's tools, forms,
equipment and materials. The court also found that de2
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fendant was entitled to certain offsetting charges which
had the effect of giving a judgment to the defendant.
The plaintiff filed his motions for new trial, or to
reopen the case to present evidence of value of his forming equipment, and to amend the findings of fact and
conclusions of Law and Judgment. The lower court denied plaintiff's motions, and plaintiff now prosecutes
this appeal.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
PoiNT I
THE COURT ERRED BY ITS FAILURE TO
GIVE FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE WRITTEN CONTRACT OF THE PARTIES.
PoiNT II
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE FINDING OF VALUE OF THE
FORMSCONVERTEDBYDEFENDANTAND
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS REFUSAL TO
EITHER REOPEN THE CASE OR AMEND
ITS FINDINGS.
PoiNT III
THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FINDING
OF THE COURT THAT PLAINTIFF ABANDONED HIS CONTRACT BUT CONTRARYWISE THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT
PLAINTIFF WAS FORCED OFF THE JOB BY
DEFENDANT.
3
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ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE COURT ERRED BY ITS FAILURE TO
GIVE FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE WRITTEN CONTRACT OF THE PARTIES.
The particular items in the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law involved in this point are contained
in paragraph six and totals $7,569.00 for work allegedly
done by the defendant and covered in plaintiff's subcontract, to wit:
Creative Terrazzo --------------------------------$ 178.00
Crane Rental ------------------------------------------$3,588.50
Columns and beams in pan area ________ $2,251.50
Beams in administrative area ------------$1,551.00
In paragraph one of the Subcontract Agreement it
is stated ''The Contractor and the Subcontractor agree
to be bound by the terms of the prime contract agreement,
construction regulations, general conditions, plans and
specifications, and any and all other contract documents,
if any there be, insofar as applicable to this subcontract
agreement ... " Plaintiff's Exhibit Two is the "Specifications Senior High School Alpine School District,
American Fork, Utah.'' Article Two, paragraph D of
these ''Specifications'' makes the general conditions
apply to "subcontractors" with equal force; then in
Article Thirty-Seven there are specific provisions which
govern the relationship of the contractor and subcontraetor, and puts the duty upon the contractor to do
certain things in respect to his subcontractors. In this
4
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connection Article 37 D (8) provides : ''No claim is valid
(against the subcontractor by the contractor) unless submitted in writing within the first 10 days of the next
month after the work is done.''
The almost obvious purpose for such a provision in
the contract is to prevent the contractor from'' trapping''
the subcontractor by accumulated claims at a time when
all evidence is gone and the opportunity of proving or
disproving such a claim is practically impossible. The
General Contractor in a large construction job such as
this is in a superior position, and as a substantial and
solid protection to the subcontractor the contract provided that No Cla,im should be valid unless submitted in
writing at the time when the facts were available to
both sides.
The defendant admitted at trial that he had not billed
the plaintiff for any of the items set out above until 10
days before the trial of this case ( TRS 143, l. 15-20)
which was approximately fourteen months after the
alleged work was done. In fact, the defendant did not
include the items set out under this point in his counterclaim filed in this case, the items appearing only at the
very time of trial.
The importance of this provision has particular significance in respect to the crane work because the contract
provides in paragraph one, ''The General Contractor
shall be responsible for the following:
1. Excavation to grade lines, pumping water from

forms, furnishing of a crane or other suitable
5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

means of elevating concrete to forms where necessary above finished floor.''
The term ''finished floor'' has no particular certain
meaning because the building has finished floors at
every level (TRS 57, l. 23-25; p. 59, l. 6-12; p. 141, l. 27;
p. 142, l. 19), and the contract meaning must be interpreted. Thus without receiving any crane billing from the
defendant the plaintiff did not know that the defendant
was accumulating such a charge under his own interpretation of the contract language. Also, in respect to
the forming in the pan area and administration area, the
plaintiff testified that these areas were formed by the
defendant as an exchange of work and in payment by
defendant for the use of the plaintiff's equipment (TRS
96, l. 24-30 ; TRS 97, l. 1-16). Again this alleged work
was not billed to the plaintiff at any time, and did not
appear in the counter claim of the defendant until a few
days before trial which was at least 14 months after the
work was performed.
By definition a contract is ''An agreement or obligation enforceable by law to do something or to refrain
from doing something" (17 C.J.S. 1) and further, "A
contract must be construed as a whole and, whenever
possible, effect will be given to all its parts," and "writings which are made a part of a contract by annexation or
reference must be so construed,'' and, ''plans and specifications, if not contained in the contract itself, but referred to therein or annexed thereto, must he construed
therewith." (17 C. J. S. 327).
6
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In the case of Anderson v. Great Eastern Casualty
Company, 168 P. 966, 5- U. 78, this court said:
''A court will not resort to construction where the
intent of the parties is expressed in clear and unambiguous language, but will enforce or give effect
to the contract according to its terms.''
And again in the case of Middleton v. Eva;ns, 45 P.
2d 570 86 U. 396, this court said :
''The intention of the parties is to be deduced from
the language employed by them, and the rule making the terms of the contract conclusive where
unambiguous is controlling.''
The provisions of the contract contained in Article
37-d-(8) are unambiguous and mandatory in its phrasing
that no claim shall be valid unless submitted in writing
within the first 10 days of the next month after the work
is done.
POINT

II

THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE FINDING OF VALUE OF THE
FORMSCONVERTEDBYDEFENDANTAND
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS REFUSAL TO
EITHER REOPEN THE CASE OR AMEND
ITS FINDINGS.
The court made a finding that the defendant had converted the forms of the plaintiff in March, 1959, and that
they had a value of $4,000.00 at the time of conversion.
The value of $4,000.00 came from the unsupported testimony of the defendant ( TRS 138, l. 27-30).
7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In Exhibit 4, the plaintiff set out the invoices covering the actual acquisition cost of the forms converted
which totals $17,707.49. Then using the tabulation set out
in paragraph 2 (c) of plaintiff's first answer to interrogatories the plaintiff showed that the first forms purchased cost $37.80 each for a 2' x 8' panel and that the
last 2' x 8' panels purchased (some seven thousand dollars' worth purchased especially for the Lehi High
School job), cost in excess of $57.00 each (See Exhibit 4)
(TRS 21, l. 21-30, also p. 22, 23, 24, and 25, l. 1-8). The
plaintiff then went on to establish the average "value"
of the large panels at $45.00 and the filler panels at their
acquisition cost, thus totaling $20,071.85. It also appears
in the evidence, and is not controverted, that these particular prefabricated concrete forms had a life of one thousand "pours," and that on the Lehi job it would require
from ten to not to exceed sixteen ''pours'' to complete
the job (TRS 72, l. 26-30; 73, l. 1-29). Thus the new
forms purchased at the start of the Lehi job would have
only been used for about sixteen pours whereas their expected life would be one thousand pours.
The defendant in his argument to the trial court and
in his memorandum brief took the position that the plaintiff could not recover for the converted forms because he
had failed to prove a "Market Value" on the forms citing Ha,ycroft v. Adams, 82 U. 347, 24 P. 2d 1110, and
Knighton v. Ma;nrn.in.g, 84 U. 1, 33 P. 2d 401, as authority.
If the plaintiff's evidence is insufficient because it was not
of such a nature as would support a deduction as to what
the market value of the forms was, then the defendant's
8
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evidence was totally insufficient to support the court's
finding of a $4,000.00 value. The only evidence produced
by the defendant as to value is his totally unsupported
statement found on page 138 of the transcript, line 30,
as follows:
''I would not appraise them over $4,000.00.''
In the later case of Lynn v. Thompson, 112 U. 24, 184
P. 2d 667, this court said :
''The acceptance by the court of the cost of the
tubes to the plaintiff may have been a recognition
of the fact that such cost closely approximated
the present market price of such pipe ; or he may
have merely accepted that cost as the most equitable, and reliable way of fixing the amount of the
damages suffered. In either case his actions were
proper.''
In the case at bar the plaintiff produced cost invoices (a clear reflection of market price) to the time
when the Lehi School job started (March 1958) which
shows the market price almost doubling in the period of
three years. The defendant testified that the average
value of the large panels was $45.00 each and that the
filler panels were the same value as their cost since these
items were two to three years old. Certainly the evidence
is sufficint from which a "Market Value" could be
deduced.
At this point in the proceedings below when the court
had chosen to adopt the statement of the defendant as
to the value of the forms converted, the plaintiff filed his
motion, supported by affidavits, to amend the Findings
of the Court or to reopen for the purpose of producing
9
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additional evidence as to damages for the conversion.
The denial of plaintiff's motion to amend or to reopen
constitutes an error of law and should not stand.
PoiNT III
THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FINDING
OF THE COURT THAT PLAINTIFF ABANDONED HIS CONTRACT BUT CONTRARYWISE THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT
PLAINTIFF WAS FORCED OFF THE JOB BY
DEFENDANT.
At the outset of the subcontract the defendant knew
that plaintiff did not have any working capital and thus
cosigned with him to obtain $1,000 from Geneva Rock
Products Co. (TRS 149 1. 11-217). The defendant knew
that plaintiff would incur large initial costs on the job
which would be spread over the entire job. Defendant
also knew that plaintiff must have his payments promptly
for work completed.
The defendant asserted no right to hold back money
and computed the amount due to plaintiff on the basis of
$10.00 per cubic yard of concrete poured (TRS 149, L
22-28). The plaintiff stated that the basis of payment
was to be at the rate of $10.00 per cubic yard and that
there would not be any hold back (TRS 62, I. 21-28).
The contract between the parties required the defendant to promptly pay the plaintiff-subcontractor his
proportion of each estimate submitted by the contractor
to the Aipine School District (See Exhibit 2 ''General
10
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Conditions" Article 37-D-1). Plaintiff's Exhibit 10 is
the monthly ''completion certificates'' executed by Max
Rosenlof and approved by the Inspector, Mr. Chatfield,
and the Architect, Fred W. Needham. To determine the
proportion of plaintiff's work, Item 46, ''Concrete and
Forming,'' has been extracted and the percentage relationship of each monthly estimate to the total contract
price has been computed and the percentage figure a pplied arithmetically to the amounts mentioned in the
subcontract. Thus, for example : The Total contract price
for ''Concrete and Forming'' was $156,056.00; the estimate submitted for the work done by the end of September, 1958, was $134,220.00; 134 over 156 equals 86% ; thus
the defendant certified that 86% of the concrete and forming had been completed, and therefore the plaintiff was
entitled to 86% of his contract price at that time. The
complete computation is set out below:

Ratio

Contract
Price
$51,000

Total
Contract
$56,820.00

09.61%
22.94%
42.94%
53.84%
67.30%
76.923%
86.01%
90.384%
92.307%

$ 4,896.00
11,679.00
21,930.00
27,540.00
34,170.00
39,270.00
43,860.00
45,900.00
46,920.00

$ 5,454.72
16,477.00
24,435.00
30,682.28
38,086.40
43,861.40
47,865.20
51,138.00
52,274.40

_W_o_rk___;,...do_n....;.e..;~;.p...;.e_r.;..;ce;..;.rt=if=ic=a;..;..;te;.__%

March '58, 15,000/156,000..........
April '58, 35,800/156,000____________
May '58, 67,000/156,000............
June '58, 83,800/156,000............
July '58, 105,000/156,000............
August '58, 120,000/156,000......
September '58, 134,000/156,000
October '58, 141,000/156,000......
November '58, 143,000/156,000..

The defendant asserted that he was not holding back
any payments and that he was making payments based
upon $10.00 per cubic yard poured. On Sept. 10, 1958,
it has been established that 4367 cubic yards had been
poured. Upon the basis of the contract and the admitted
policy of the defendant under the contract the plaintiff
11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

was entitled to at least $43,670.00 by September 10, 1958,
and upon the basis of the entire job he was entitled to
$47,865.20. The defendant had received the money from
the School Board and was obligated to pay plaintiff. The
total amount that had been paid to plaintiff by the end
of September, 1958, was $35,040.00, thus leaving $8,630.00
due under the most conservative construction of the contract between the parties. The total amount of obligation of the plaintiff on the job at this time was $5,904.39,
which included "snap ties" sufficient to finish the entire
job and capital items of lumber totaling $670.00 (see
stipulated unpaid bills).
The defendant knew that the plaintiff needed prompt
and full payment of the amounts due to him in order
to keep up with the high cost of the first part of the job.
The defendant alleges that there was a critical situ~tion
and that the creditors were closing in on the plaintiff,
however, all of the bills which were unpaid at the time
when the plaintiff was excluded from the job remained
unpaid at the time of trial.
If the defendant had paid the plaintiff as he said
he would do and as required by the contract, there would
not have been any stress. The preponderance of the evidence establishes the fact that plaintiff was forced off
the job. Plaintiff's men, foreman, materials and equipment were on the job when defendant commandeered
them. All the evidence supports the contention of a forceful taking by defendant based upon an excuse fabricated
and created by defendant's own failure to pay plaintiff
as promised and required.
12
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The majority of the work remaining to be done when
defendant took over was flat work which is low cost and
high profit work. It is the work in which the subcontractor usually has his profit. The defendant said that his
estimated cost to form and pour the remaining concrete
was $4.45 per cubic yard (TRS 149, l. 3-6; p. 152, l. 10).
In connection with the completion of the work by
defendant it is to be noted that defendant asserted a right
to take over pursuant to the provisions of paragraph three
of the Subcontract Agreement. This paragraph requires
that defendant ''complete the work ... in the most economical manner available to him at the time." At the
time plaintiff was excluded from the job the work was
approximately 85% completed (see Exhibit 10) and the
evidence is to the effect that plaintiff had enough lumber
and shap-ties on the job to complete the contract (TRS
45, l. 29-30; 46, 1.1-14; 42, l. 21-30; 43, l.l-7). The total
lumber purchased by the plaintiff was $2815.51 ( TRS 15,
1. 4-16) for 85% of the job. However, defendant claimed
that he bought $3820.00 worth of lumber to complete 15%
of the job (TRS 137,. l. 27-30; 138, l. 1-7) and that it was
all totally consumed. The plaintiff and his witnesses asserted that very little of the lumber is consumed by the
framing and pouring process but that the majority could
be used over and over ( TRS 12, l. 17-30 ; 13, l. 1-3 ;
45, l. 2-4).
The evidence 1n this case clearly preponderate in
favor of the plaintiff's contention that he was wrongfully excluded from the job and that the alleged purchase
of materials by the defendant was not necessary to com13
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plete the concrete work but must have been for other uses
on the general construction job.

CONCLUSION
The finding of the court in paragraph 6 should be
reversed and the specific provisions of the contract making such claims invalid should be enforced.
The finding of the court as to the value of the forms
converted should be reversed and a new finding made
that said forms were of the value of $20,071.85, or, in the
alternative the case should be remanded for further trial
on the question of value.
The allowance by the court of the cost of materials to
complete the job in the amount of $3820.00 should be
reversed.
Respectfully submitted
PETER M. LOWE
Attorn.ey for Appellent
103 Executive Building
455 East 4th South
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
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